JC,
Thanks for the courteous response. I grow weary of engaging unbelievers who use nearly nothing but ad hominems. Your responses/interaction has thus far been a breath of fresh air. Keep it up my friend! :-)
It is important to note that what I previously offered is by no means extensive, but only a brief overall sketch of my apologetic. I said, "the short answer is that the proof that God exists is that without Him you can't prove anything." You responded,
This is argumentum ad consequentiam. I could just as easily say the proof that God does NOT exist is that if he did you could not prove anything. These types of arguments get us nowhere."1. This isn't an argument to undesirable consequences; though the consequences of denying such should be undesirable for the rational person. When an argument is about a certain proposition, it is reasonable to assess the truth-value of any logical consequences of it. Logical consequences should not be confused with causal consequences, and truth or falsity should not be confused with goodness or badness. Since God is the necessary precondition for the intelligibility of reality, then it follows that one couldn't prove anything, much less His existence without first assuming His existence since His existence is the very thing needed for the concept of proof in the first place. Thus, the proposition itself (i.e., the existence of God) is in question, not the logical relation of the proposition to the intelligibility of reality or the issue of whether the consequences are desirable or not.
2. Everybody reasons in a circle and doing so isn't always fallacious. There are two things we need to discuss about circular reasoning: It is (1) absolutely unavoidable and (2) not necessarily fallacious. Circular reasoning is unavoidable to some degree when proving one's ultimate standard. An ultimate standard cannot be proved from anything else, otherwise it wouldn't be ultimate. Therefore, if it is to be proved, it must use itself as its own standard of judgment by which any decision is made.
God uses non-fallacious circular reasoning
God Himself uses a non-fallacious type of circular reasoning when He makes an oath. Human beings appeal to a greater authority as confirmation of an oath (Heb. 6:16). But since God is ultimate, He can only use Himself as the authority (Heb. 6:13). Thus, clearly some degree of circular reasoning is necessary when proving one's ultimate authority.
Not all circles are fallacious
Second, all circles aren't necessarily fallacious. Begging the question is often considered a fallacy because it is usually arbitrary. But it can be non-arbitrary if it goes beyond a simple circle (i.e., the Bible is true because it says so) and uses additional information to support its conclusion. If the ultimate authority is first assumed and you find out later you have good reasons for it because without it you cannot make sense out of anything, then its perfectly legitimate to reason in a circle.
All ultimate authorities must appeal to themselves as part of their own proof
In fact, any true ultimate authority must use itself as part of its own proof. Again, some degree of circular reasoning is involved, but it cannot be a simple "vicious" circle. It must be non-arbitrary. Consider logic:
1 - If there were no laws of logic, we couldn't make an argument.This argument is perfectly sound yet it is subtly circular. It's what is known as a modus tollens syllogism (i.e., denying the consequent) and in this "proof", we have assumed that there are laws of logic. Modus tollens is a law of inference in logic, and we have used it as part of the proof that there are laws of logic. In this case we had no other choice; in order to get anywhere in any argument we must presuppose that there are laws of logic.
2 - We can make an argument.
3 - Therefore, there must be laws of logic.
How circular arguments can be non-fallacious
However, this example argument doesn't merely assume what its trying to prove; it imports additional information to support its conclusion. What makes this circular argument a powerful one is that to deny it would be to assume it, thus any potential rebuttal would be self-defeating. A great way to show that a particular presupposition must be true is to show that one would have to assume that the presupposition is true even to argue against it in the first place.
An argument that proves something that is necessary for reasoning, proof, and evidence in the first place is called a transcendental argument. It asks "What must first exist to make sense out of everything else?" It is not like the arguments you are used to hearing from Christians (direct, deductive arguments or indirect, inductive arguments).
The Christian's ultimate standard
The Christian's ultimate standard is like this; any attempt to refute the Bible must assume things about the world that could only be true if the Bible were true in order to get started. The Bible not only provides the criteria for itself, but it does so for all other facts, hence, the reasoning isn't viciously circular. It gives us a foundation (the Biblical God) for rational reasoning (including laws of logic), science, morality, reliability of our senses and memory, and so on.
It even gives us a foundation for why we should not be inconsistent or arbitrary (because God isn't, and we are to imitate Him - Eph. 5:1). The Bible passes its own criteria for truth (it is consistent and non-arbitrary, etc.) and provides criteria for everything else. The Christian circle is not a vicious circle, but one that can account for all human experience and reasoning.
As with the argument for laws of logic, any attempted rebuttal would be self-refuting, because it would have to use things (laws of logic, the charge to be consistent, etc.) that presuppose a universe that can only exist if Christian theism is true. Thus, we are not merely arguing "The Bible must be the word of God because it says so". Rather, we are saying, "The Bible must be the word of God not only because it says it is, but if you reject this claim you are reduced to absurdity."
Indeed, "in Christ are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge." Colossians 2:3
You said,
Your first statement “and rationality necessarily requires an ultimate, transcendent, universal, personal justification ...” is only supported by an appeal to consequences i.e. “... or else it is contingent, arbitrary, conventional, and ultimately all rationality breaks down if one is consistent”. The next statement “logic is immaterial, abstract, and universal” is also not supported and would need more clarification.3. Logic must be grounded in God. Again, there's nothing necessarily wrong with an appeal to consequences because when an argument is about a certain proposition, it is reasonable to assess the truth-value of any logical consequences of it. That logic is immaterial is demonstrated via the following syllogisms:
1. Material things are extended in space.Thus, if philosophical materialism is true then logic doesn't exist. Logic exists, therefore philosophical materialism is false.
2. Our concepts of "logic" are not extended in space.
3. Therefore, our concepts of "logic" are non-material.
4. Some versions of materialism posit that no non-material entities exist.
5. Therefore, assuming some versions of materialism, concepts of "logic" do not exist.
Syllogism two:
1. Concepts are immaterial.
2. But some versions of materialism hold that anything that exists is material.
3. Our concepts are not material things.
4. Therefore, concepts do not exist.
5. Our concepts of "logic" are immaterial.
6. Therefore, in some versions of materialism, "logic" does not exist.
The immaterial Christian God grounds immaterial logic as God is rational and orderly by nature and originally imputed said order to His created order, especially for those created in His image. Positing an immaterial abstract realm like Plato's realm of ideals contradicts naturalism as it appeals to "other-worldly" explanations which are disdained in most modern naturalistic philosophizing, doesn't tell us how the immaterial realm of the forms informs the physical world, nor is an abstract, impersonal immaterial realm able to ground the personal moral obligation to be logical. Arguments to the contrary have been demonstrated to be unsuccessful.
Second, logic has a moral component; i.e., we are obligated to be rational and logical. Appeals to survival value via natural selection, appeals to logic as an emergent property of the material brain, or social contract theory are irrelevant as they tell us what is the case not necessarily what should be the case. To ground universal personal moral obligation, you need such obligation grounded in a personal transcendent, universal source. Such grounding is satisfied in the Triune God. Thus, unless you begin with this God in all of your reasoning, you can't account for your reasoning processes because those very processes require resources that can only exist, be grounded, and normative if the immaterial God of Scripture exists.
4. Knowledge must be grounded in God: Dr. James Anderson puts it well:
Careful reflection on the concept of knowledge in general, and on paradigm cases of knowledge, make it clear that this notion of ‘epistemic rightness’ or ‘epistemic appropriateness’ is an essential feature of knowledge. But observe that this notion is clearly a normative one: it pertains to how beliefs ought to be formed or held (in order to count as knowledge), rather than how beliefs are formed or held. It is not a descriptive notion, but a prescriptive one. It implies that there are epistemic norms which determine (in part) whether or not one’s belief that p is actually knowledge that p.At the end of the above paper, Dr. Anderson reviews the worldviews he's already refuted and notes re: knowledge:
That the concept of knowledge has an essentially normative aspect, and thus there are such things as epistemic norms (if there is such a thing as knowledge), is a point widely recognised by contemporary epistemologists. For example, Jaegwon Kim writes:
[Epistemic] justification manifestly is normative. If a belief is justified for us, then it is permissible and reasonable, from the epistemic point of view, for us to hold it, and it would be epistemically irresponsible to hold beliefs that contradict it. . . . Epistemology is a normative discipline as much as, and in the same sense as, normative ethics. (Kim, 1988, p. 383, emphasis original)The fact that there is such a thing as epistemic normativity has interesting implications. In the first place, it poses a serious problem for metaphysical naturalism, for there is no place within a thoroughgoing naturalism for any irreducible normativity. According to the metaphysical naturalist, all phenomena are ultimately explicable in scientific terms (if explicable at all), but science is a purely descriptive discipline. Science describes rather than prescribes. It tells us how things are, as a matter of empirical fact; it has nothing to tell us about how things ought to be. As Alvin Plantinga has remarked:
[Naturalism’s] Achilles’ heel (in addition to its deplorable falsehood) is that it has no room for normativity. There is no room, within naturalism, for right or wrong, or good or bad. (Plantinga, 1998, p. 356, emphasis original)So naturalism, as a metaphysical position, cannot accommodate the notion of right or wrong ways to form or hold beliefs. Consequently, it cannot accommodate the notion of epistemic warrant. In short: if we know anything at all, then naturalism must be false. [http://www.proginosko.com/docs/knowledge_and_theism.html]
Some general conclusions can be drawn from all this. It appears that any worldview whose ontology can underwrite a viable account of epistemic warrant must exhibit the following features: (1) it must be non-naturalist (i.e., it must make room for real objective normativity); (2) it must posit a fundamental ontological distinction between that which grounds or originates epistemic norms and that which is subject to epistemic norms; and (3) it must posit a ground of epistemic normativity that is personal (i.e., exhibiting features such as intellect and volition). In short, we are looking for a worldview with an ontology that includes a supernatural personal being whose character or intentions give rise to norms for human thought; that is, a broadly theistic worldview.
In conclusion, then, we have solid reasons for believing that if human knowledge is possible then there must be a God. Knowledge presupposes the existence of objective epistemic normativity, which in turn presupposes an ontology that can account for the existence of such normativity. Naturalism, as many of its contemporary advocates now acknowledge, has no place for objective epistemic normativity. And non-theistic non-naturalisms fall short on other grounds: by trying to ground epistemic normativity in the non-personal, or by failing to distinguish the normative from the normed, or by leaving unexplained the connection between the normative and the normed. Only theistic worldviews have the metaphysical resources to underwrite the most defensible analyses of epistemic warrant. In four words: if knowledge, then God. [Ibid.]
I noted, “Knowledge is justified true belief or warrant. Naturalism must appeal to one's senses and reasoning to verify one's senses and reasoning. This is a classic version of question begging and it can only be escaped by appealing to an all-knowing, personal, a priori source. Hence, God.” You responded,
What do you mean by “verify” one's senses and reasoning?I mean that to confirm or assume that they are functioning properly you have to use them to confirm and assume them. This is a classic example of begging the question because you're assuming the very thing you're trying to prove in order to prove it without going outside of the same plane of reasoning to prove it. Thus, this doesn't meet the classic definition of knowledge normally defined by philosophers as justified, true, belief. In order to escape this vicious circularity and have knowledge that your senses are valid without appealing to irrationality to do it, you must appeal to an all-knowing Source that exists outside of your senses that can confirm the general reliability of your senses (Proverbs 20:12). For more information see my article Sensation, Reason, and Christian Epistemology.
The last part “This is a classic version of question begging and it can only be escaped by appealing to an all-knowing, personal, a priori source. Hence, God” its self seems to be question begging as again you are appealing to the presupposition in question.IN CONCLUSION, all ultimate authorities must appeal to themselves to justify themselves because that is the nature of proving ultimate authorities. Since God defines Himself in His own word as the ultimate authority (Isaiah 43:10-11; Heb. 6:13), then all of our reasoning must begin with Him. The converse of this is to undermine all knowledge claims as both I and the quotes above from Dr. James Anderson demonstrate.
